《世界经济展望》WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

《世界经济展望》

來章来源作者邱志勇文章取自金融分析專家及各大媒體文章內容不代表本網立場

2024年4月16日

《世界经济展望》介绍工作人员对全球层面、主要国家组（按地区和经济发展阶段等划分）和许多单个国家的经济发展的分析和预测。重点是经济政策问题以及对经济发展和前景的分析。通常每年出版两期，作为国际货币与金融委员会会议的文件，而且是基金组织进行全球监督活动的主要工具。

概览

全球复苏进程平稳但缓慢，并且存在地区差异

我们的基线预测是，世界经济在2024年和2025年将继续以3.2%的速度增长，与2023年的增速相同。发达经济体的经济增速将小幅加快，预计将从2023年的1.6%上升到2024年的1.7%和2025年的1.8%，但将被新兴市场和发展中经济体增速的小幅放缓所抵消，后者的增速预计将从2023年的4.3%下降至2024年和2025年的4.2%。五年后全球经济增速的预测值为3.1%，处于几十年来的最低水平。全球通胀预计将从2023年的6.8%稳步下降至2024年的5.9%和2025年的4.5%，其中发达经济体将比新兴市场和发展中经济体更快将通胀降至目标水平。总体而言，核心通胀预计将下降得更慢。

尽管各国央行大幅加息以恢复价格稳定，但全球经济仍表现出惊人的韧性。第二章指出，按揭贷款和住房市场在疫情之前十年低利率环境下发生的变化缓和了政策利率大幅上调带来的短期影响。第三章关注中期前景，并表明人均产出增速预测值的下降主要源于长期存在的结构性摩擦，这种摩擦阻碍了资本和劳动力向生产率高的企业转移。第四章进一步说明，中国和其他大型新兴市场经济体增长前景的减弱将对贸易伙伴产生怎样的不利影响。

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/04/16/world-economic-outlook-april-2024

《世界经济展望》

在2022-2023年全球抗击通胀期间，经济
活动表现出惊人的韧性。随着全球通胀从2022
年中期的峰值回落，经济活动稳步增长，有
关滞胀和全球经济衰退的警告并未成为现实。
就业和收入保持了稳定增长，这是因为需求呈
有利形势（包括政府支出和家庭消费高于预
期），以及供给侧出现扩张，尤其是劳动力参
与率意外提高。在各国央行为恢复价格稳定而
大幅加息的情况下，经济出乎意料地表现出韧
性，这也反映出主要发达经济体中的家庭能够
动用其在疫情期间积累的大量储蓄。此外，正
如第二章所述，按揭贷款和住房市场在疫情之
前十年低利率时期发生的变化，缓和了政策利
率大幅上调带来的短期影响。随着通胀率向目
标水平靠拢，同时许多经济体的央行开始放松
政策，旨在通过提高税收、减少政府支出来遏
制政府债务高企的财政紧缩政策预计会对经济
增长造成拖累。
2023年的全球增速估计为3.2%，预计
2024年和2025年将保持同样的速度。2024年的
预测值相比2024年1月《世界经济展望更新》
的预测值上调了0.1个百分点，相比2023年10
月《世界经济展望》的预测值上调了0.3个百
分点。按照历史标准衡量，经济扩张的速度较
低，原因既包括借款成本居高不下、财政支持
政策退出等短期因素，也包括新冠疫情和俄罗
斯入侵乌克兰、生产率增长乏力、地缘经济
割裂加剧造成的长期影响。预计全球总体通
胀率将从2023年6.8%的年均值下降至2024年
的5.9%和2025年的4.5%，发达经济体通胀率
回归目标水平的速度要快于新兴市场和发展
中经济体。五年后全球增速的最新预测值为
3.1%，处于几十年来的最低水平。中等收入
国家和低收入国家赶上更高生活水平的速度有
所放缓，这意味着全球经济差距持续存在。正
如第三章所述，中期前景相对疲软，反映了人
均GDP增速放缓，放缓的主要原因是结构性摩
擦持续存在，阻碍了资本和劳动力流向生产率
更高的企业。第四章讨论的是，由于中国及其
他大型新兴市场经济体在全球经济中的占比不
断提高，其增长前景减弱将给贸易伙伴国的增
长前景带来怎样的影响。
当前，全球前景面临的风险大致均衡。从
下行方面看，如果乌克兰战争以及加沙和以色
列的冲突等地缘政治紧张局势致使价格进一步
飙升，加上劳动力市场持续从紧导致核心通胀
居高不下，可能会引发利率预期走高和资产价
格下跌。如果主要经济体降低通胀的速度出现
分化，还可能导致汇率变动，给金融部门带来
压力。随着固定利率按揭贷款利率重新设定，
家庭面临债务高企问题，高利率造成的需求降
温效应可能会超出预期，从而形成资金压力。
在中国，如果不为陷入困境的房地产行业制定
全面的对策，经济增长可能会减弱，从而损害
贸易伙伴的利益。在许多经济体政府债务高企
的情况下，如果以破坏性的方式实行政策转
向，增加税收并削减支出，可能会导致经济活
动疲软、信心低迷，为旨在减少气变风险的改
革和支出提供的支持也会遭到削弱。地缘经济
割裂可能会加剧，货物、资本和人员流动面临
更高的壁垒，这意味着供给侧增长会放缓。从
上行方面看，如果财政政策较所需的必要程度
和预测中假设更为宽松，则可能会在短期内提
振经济活动，但以后的政策调整成本可能会更
高。在劳动力参与率进一步提高的情况下，通
胀率下降的速度可能快于预期，使央行能够提
前推出宽松计划。人工智能和比预期更为强劲
的结构性改革可以提振生产率。
随着全球经济接近实现软着陆，各国央
行近期的优先任务是确保通胀平稳回落，既不
概要
要过早放松政策，也不要拖得太久，导致通胀
不达目标。与此同时，随着各国央行降低政策
紧缩性，应将重点重新放在开展中期财政整顿
上，以重建预算回旋和重点项目投资的空间，
并确保债务具有可持续性。各国之间的情况不
同，因此需要采取针对性的政策应对措施。大
力推进改善供给的改革将有助于降低通胀和减
少债务，使各经济体能将增速提高至较高的疫
情前平均水平，并加快向更高的收入水平靠
拢。各方需要开展多边合作来限制地缘经济割
裂和气候变化的成本和风险，加快向绿色

世界经济展望
国际货币基金组织|2024年4WORLD
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
2024
APR
Steady but Slow:
Resilience amid Divergence
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

WORLD
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
Steady but Slow:
Resilience amid Divergence
2024
APR
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
©2024 International Monetary Fund
Cover and Design: IMF CSF Creative Solutions Division
Composition: Absolute Service, Inc.; and AGS, An RR Donnelley Company
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Names: International Monetary Fund.
Title: World economic outlook (International Monetary Fund)
Other titles: WEO | Occasional paper (International Monetary Fund) | World economic and
financial surveys.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 1980- | Semiannual | Some
issues also have thematic titles. | Began with issue for May 1980. | 1981-1984: Occasional
paper / International Monetary Fund, 0251-6365 | 1986-: World economic and financial
surveys, 0256-6877.
Identifiers: ISSN 0256-6877 (print) | ISSN 1564-5215 (online)
Subjects: LCSH: Economic development—Periodicals. | International economic relations—
Periodicals. | Debts, External—Periodicals. | Balance of payments—Periodicals. |
International finance—Periodicals. | Economic forecasting—Periodicals.
Classification: LCC HC10.W79
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ISBN 979-8-40025-589-2 (English Paper)
979-8-40025-613-4 (English ePub)
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Disclaimer: The World Economic Outlook (WEO) is a survey by the IMF staff published twice a year, in the spring and fall. The WEO is prepared by the IMF staff and
has benefited from comments and suggestions by Executive Directors following their
discussion of the report on April 3, 2024. The views expressed in this publication are
those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive
Directors or their national authorities.
Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund. 2024. World Economic Outlook—
Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence. Washington, DC. April.
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International Monetary Fund | April 2024 iii
Assumptions and Conventions viii
Further Information x
Data xi
Preface xii
Foreword xiii
Executive Summary xvi
Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policies 1
Disinflation amid Economic Resilience 1
The Outlook: Steady Growth and Disinflation 7
Risks to the Outlook: Broadly Balanced 16
Globally Consistent Risk Assessment of the World Economic Outlook Forecast 19
Policies: From Fighting Inflation to Restocking Fiscal Arsenals 20
Box 1.1. Fragmentation Is Already Affecting International Trade 24
Box 1.2. Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s
Baseline Projections 25
Commodity Special Feature: Market Developments and the Power of Prices 29
References 41
Chapter 2. Feeling the Pinch? Tracing the Effects of Monetary Policy through Housing Markets 43
Introduction 43
Monetary Tightening and Real Estate: Context and Stylized Facts 45
The Housing Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission 47
Housing Channels Vary Significantly across Countries 49
Housing Channels May Have Weakened in Many Countries 55
Policy Implications 57
Box 2.1. Interest Rate Pass-Through in Europe 58
Box 2.2. China’s Monetary Policy and the Housing Market 60
References 61
Chapter 3. Slowdown in Global Medium-Term Growth: What Will It Take to Turn the Tide? 65
Introduction 65
Insights from Medium-Term Forecasts 67
How Did We Get Here? 68
Where Is Growth Heading? 75
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 77
Box 3.1. Allocative Efficiency: Concept, Examples, and Measurement 79
Box 3.2. Distributional Implications of Medium-Term Growth Prospects 80
Box 3.3. The Potential Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Global Productivity and
Labor Markets 82
References 84
CONTENTS
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence
iv International Monetary Fund | April 2024
Chapter 4. Trading Places: Real Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets 87
Introduction 87
G20 Emerging Markets in the Global Economy 90
Aggregate Spillovers in the Short Term 93
Spillovers from Trade and Global Value Chains 95
Can the Other G20 Emerging Markets Support Global Growth? 101
Conclusions and Policy Implications 102
Box 4.1. Industrial Policies in Emerging Markets: Old and New 104
Box 4.2. Capital Flows to G20 Emerging Markets and the Allocation Puzzle 105
Box 4.3. Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets to Sub-Saharan Africa 106
References 107
Statistical Appendix 111
Assumptions 111
What’s New 111
Data and Conventions 112
Country Notes 113
Classification of Economies 115
General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook
Classification 115
Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in
Aggregate GDP, Exports of Goods and Services, and Population, 2023 117
Table B. Advanced Economies by Subgroup 118
Table C. European Union 118
Table D. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source
of Export Earnings 119
Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position,
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and Per Capita Income Classification 120
Table F. Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods 122
Table G. Key Data Documentation 123
Box A1. Economic Policy Assumptions underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 133
List of Tables 137
Output (Tables A1–A4) 138
Inflation (Tables A5–A7) 145
Financial Policies (Table A8) 150
Foreign Trade (Table A9) 151
Current Account Transactions (Tables A10–A12) 153
Balance of Payments and External Financing (Table A13) 160
Flow of Funds (Table A14) 164
Medium-Term Baseline Scenario (Table A15) 167
World Economic Outlook Selected Topics 169
IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, April 2024 179
Tables
Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections 10
Table 1.2. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections at
Market Exchange Rate Weights 12
Table 1.2.1. Fiscal Impulse Relative to Baseline 26
Table 4.1. Sectors in G20 Economies with the Largest Employment Spillovers 100
contents
International Monetary Fund | April 2024 v
Annex Table 1.1.1. European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 35
Annex Table 1.1.2. Asian and Pacific Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 36
Annex Table 1.1.3. Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 37
Annex Table 1.1.4. Middle East and Central Asia Economies: Real GDP,
Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 38
Annex Table 1.1.5. Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 39
Annex Table 1.1.6. Summary of World Real per Capita Output 40
Online Tables—Statistical Appendix
Table B1. Advanced Economies: Unemployment, Employment, and Real GDP per Capita
Table B2. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP
Table B3. Advanced Economies: Hourly Earnings, Productivity, and Unit Labor
Costs in Manufacturing
Table B4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices
Table B5. Summary of Fiscal and Financial Indicators
Table B6. Advanced Economies: General and Central Government Net Lending/Borrowing
and General Government Net Lending/Borrowing Excluding Social Security Schemes
Table B7. Advanced Economies: General Government Structural Balances
Table B8. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: General Government
Net Lending/Borrowing and Overall Fiscal Balance
Table B9. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: General Government
Net Lending/Borrowing
Table B10. Selected Advanced Economies: Exchange Rates
Table B11. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Broad Money Aggregates
Table B12. Advanced Economies: Export Volumes, Import Volumes, and Terms of
Trade in Goods and Services
Table B13. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region: Total Trade in Goods
Table B14. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Source of
Export Earnings: Total Trade in Goods
Table B15. Summary of Current Account Transactions
Table B16. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Summary of
External Debt and Debt Service
Table B17. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:
External Debt by Maturity
Table B18. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Analytical Criteria:
External Debt by Maturity
Table B19. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Ratio of External Debt to GDP
Table B20. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Debt-Service Ratios
Table B21. Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Medium-Term
Baseline Scenario: Selected Economic Indicators
Figures
Figure 1.1. Global Inflation Falling as Output Grows 2
Figure 1.2. Performance in 2022–23 Compared with Projections at Time of
Cost-of-Living Crisis 2
Figure 1.3. Domestic- and Foreign-Born Workers in the Labor Force 3
Figure 1.4. Supply-Chain Pressures and Red Sea Tensions 3
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence
vi International Monetary Fund | April 2024
Figure 1.5. Global Energy Price and Oil Supply 4
Figure 1.6. Near-Term Inflation Expectations Falling 4
Figure 1.7. Labor Markets Cooling 5
Figure 1.8. Decomposition of Inflation Drivers 5
Figure 1.9. Monetary Tightening: Nominal and Real 6
Figure 1.10. Savings from the Pandemic: Declining 7
Figure 1.11. Sovereign Bond Spreads in Emerging Market and Developing Economies 7
Figure 1.12. Elevated Debt and Deficits 8
Figure 1.13. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Projections 8
Figure 1.14. Growth Outlook: Broadly Stable 9
Figure 1.15. Inflation Outlook: Falling 13
Figure 1.16. Inflation Closer to Target 14
Figure 1.17. Global Trade Outlook: Stable 14
Figure 1.18. Current Account and International Investment Positions 15
Figure 1.19. Forecasts for Global GDP and GDP per Capita 15
Figure 1.20. Geopolitical Risk and Oil Prices 16
Figure 1.21. Sharper-than-Expected Fiscal Adjustment in the Euro Area, 2010–15 17
Figure 1.22. Confidence in Government, Parliament, and Political Parties 18
Figure 1.23. AI Performance on Human Tasks 19
Figure 1.24. Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment 21
Figure 1.25. Drivers of Sovereign Debt Ratings in Emerging Market and
Developing Economies 22
Figure 1.1.1. Fragmentation Affecting Trade 24
Figure 1.2.1. Distribution of Forecast Uncertainty around Global GDP Growth and
Inflation Projections 25
Figure 1.2.2. Impact of Scenarios on GDP Level and Headline Inflation 27
Figure 1.SF.1. Commodity Market Developments 29
Figure 1.SF.2. Volatility of Commodity Prices 30
Figure 1.SF.3. Herfindahl Index by Commodity, 2021 31
Figure 1.SF.4. Common versus Idiosyncratic Factors in Commodity Demand and Supply 32
Figure 1.SF.5. Cumulative Supply and Demand Responses to a 1 Percent Price Increase 33
Figure 2.1. Nominal Policy Rates in Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets 45
Figure 2.2. Nominal House Prices in Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets 46
Figure 2.3. Commercial Real Estate Prices 46
Figure 2.4. Evolution of House Prices and Consumption in the Postpandemic
Tightening Cycle 47
Figure 2.5. The Housing Channels of Monetary Policy 47
Figure 2.6. Heterogeneity in Mortgage Market Characteristics 49
Figure 2.7. Differential Effects of Monetary Policy Depending on
Mortgage Market Characteristics 50
Figure 2.8. Differential Effects of Monetary Policy on Consumption Depending on
Shares of Fixed-Rate Mortgages 51
Figure 2.9. Effects of Monetary Policy on Consumption 52
Figure 2.10. Differential Effects of Monetary Policy Depending on Local Housing
Market Characteristics 53
Figure 2.11. Differential Effects of Monetary Policy on House Prices Depending on
Supply Restrictions 54
Figure 2.12. Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Transmission 55
Figure 2.13. Changes in the Share of Fixed-Rate Mortgages 56
Figure 2.14. Changes in Monetary Policy Transmission 56
contents
International Monetary Fund | April 2024 vii
Figure 2.1.1. Pass-Through to Bank Interest Rates over Time 58
Figure 2.1.2. Pass-Through and Share of Households with Mortgages (2021–23) 59
Figure 2.1.3. Changes in Mortgage Service Costs after European Central Bank Hikes 59
Figure 2.2.1. China: Short-Term Market Interest Rates and House Price Growth 60
Figure 3.1. Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Growth Projections, 2000–29 66
Figure 3.2. Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Forecast by Country: April 2008 versus
April 2024 67
Figure 3.3. Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Forecast by Regions, 2008, 2019, and 2024 67
Figure 3.4. Contribution of Components of GDP Growth, 1995–2023 68
Figure 3.5. Slowdown in the Growth of the Working-Age Population,
2008 versus 2021 69
Figure 3.6. Breakdown of Change in Labor Force Participation Rate, 2008–21 69
Figure 3.7. Policies and Labor Force Participation by Gender and Age 70
Figure 3.8. Real Business Investment in OECD Countries 70
Figure 3.9. Net Investment Rates in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 71
Figure 3.10. Contribution of Firm- and Macro-Level Determinants to Changes in the
Investment Rate since 2008 71
Figure 3.11. Contribution of Allocative Efficiency to Annual TFP Growth, 2000–19 72
Figure 3.12. Contribution of Allocative Efficiency to Annual TFP Growth, 2000–19 73
Figure 3.13. TFP Loss from Misallocation, by Sector Type, 2019 73
Figure 3.14. Dispersion of Firm Productivity, 2000–19 74
Figure 3.15. Countries’ Structural Allocative Efficiency and Policies 74
Figure 3.16. Medium-Term Growth Projections of Potential Employment 75
Figure 3.17. Impact of Various Factors on Global Medium-Term Growth 76
Figure 3.2.1. GDP Convergence between Countries, 2000–28 80
Figure 3.2.2. Global Inequality, 1995–2028 80
Figure 3.2.3. GDP Growth and Welfare Drivers before and after the
COVID-19 Pandemic 81
Figure 3.3.1. Employment Shares by AI Exposure and Complementarity 82
Figure 3.3.2. Impact of AI on TFP and Output in the United Kingdom 83
Figure 4.1. Five-Year-Ahead GDP Growth 88
Figure 4.2. Correlation of Idiosyncratic Growth Surprises between Advanced
Economies and G20 Emerging Markets 88
Figure 4.3. The Growing Footprint of G20 Emerging Markets in
Trade and Investment 90
Figure 4.4. G20 Emerging Market Financial Integration 91
Figure 4.5. G20 Emerging Market Presence in Global Value Chains and
Commodities Can Amplify Spillovers 92
Figure 4.6. Growth in G20 Emerging Markets Is Becoming Less Volatile and
Less Driven by Foreign Shocks 93
Figure 4.7. Aggregate Spillovers from G20 Countries 94
Figure 4.8. Growth Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets by Region 95
Figure 4.9. Firm-Level Spillovers 96
Figure 4.10. Impact of Spillovers on GDP by G20 Emerging Markets 97
Figure 4.11. Changes in Sectoral Value Added and Prices 99
Figure 4.12. What Is the Global Impact from a G20 Emerging Market Upside
Scenario on Real GDP? 102
Figure 4.1.1. The Rise of Domestic Subsidies and Their Impact on Exports 104
Figure 4.2.1. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Revisiting the Allocation Puzzle 105
Figure 4.3.1. Role of G20 Emerging Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 106
viii International Monetary Fund | April 2024
A number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic Outlook
(WEO). It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates remained constant at their average levels during January 30, 2024–February 27, 2024, except for those for the currencies participating in the European exchange rate
mechanism II, which are assumed to have remained constant in nominal terms relative to the euro; that established policies of national authorities will be maintained (for specific assumptions about fiscal and monetary policies for selected economies, see Box A1 in the Statistical Appendix); that the average price of oil will be $78.61
a barrel in 2024 and $73.68 a barrel in 2025; that the three-month government bond yield for the United States
will average 5.2 percent in 2024 and 4.1 percent in 2025, that for the euro area will average 3.5 percent in 2024
and 2.6 percent in 2025, and that for Japan will average 0.0 percent in 2024 and 0.1 percent in 2025; and that
the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will average 4.1 percent in 2024 and 3.7 percent in 2025,
that for the euro area will average 2.5 percent in 2024 and 2.6 percent in 2025, and that for Japan will average
1.0 percent in 2024 and 1.1 percent in 2025. These are, of course, working hypotheses rather than forecasts,
and the uncertainties surrounding them add to the margin of error that would, in any event, be involved in the
projections. The estimates and projections are based on statistical information available through April 1, 2024.
The following conventions are used throughout the WEO:
• . . . to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;
• – between years or months (for example, 2023–24 or January–June) to indicate the years or months covered,
including the beginning and ending years or months; and
• / between years or months (for example, 2023/24) to indicate a fiscal or financial year.
• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
• “Basis points” refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of
1 percentage point).
• Data refer to calendar years, except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in
the Statistical Appendix, which lists the economies with exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and
government finance data for each country.
• For some countries, the figures for 2023 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns. Please
refer to Table G in the Statistical Appendix, which lists the latest actual outturns for the indicators in the
national accounts, prices, government finance, and balance of payments for each country.
What is new in this publication:
• Ecuador’s fiscal sector projections are excluded from publication for 2024–29 because of ongoing program
discussions.
• Vietnam has been removed from the Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) group and added to the
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies (EMMIEs) group.
• For West Bank and Gaza, data for 2022–23 previously excluded from publication pending methodological adjustments to statistical series are now included. Projections for 2024–29 are excluded from publication on account of
the unusually high degree of uncertainty.
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONS
Assumptions and Conventions
International Monetary Fund | April 2024 ix
Assumptions and Conventions
In the tables and figures, the following conventions apply:
• Tables and figures in this report that list their source as “IMF staff calculations” or “IMF staff estimates” draw
on data from the WEO database.
• When countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.
• Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.
• Composite data are provided for various groups of countries organized according to economic characteristics or
region. Unless noted otherwise, country group composites represent calculations based on 90 percent or more of
the weighted group data.
• The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on maps do not imply, on the part of
the IMF, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
As used in this report, the terms “country” and “economy” do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is
a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities
that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
x International Monetary Fund | April 2024
Corrections and Revisions
The data and analysis appearing in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) are compiled by the IMF staff at the
time of publication. Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. When errors are
discovered, corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and
on the IMF eLibrary (see below). All substantive changes are listed in the online table of contents.
Print and Digital Editions
Print
Print copies of this WEO can be ordered from the IMF bookstore at imfbk.st/540746.
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IMF eLibrary at http://www.elibrary.imf.org/APR24WEO.
Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at
www.imf.org/publications/weo or scan the QR code below to access the WEO web page directly:
Copyright and Reuse
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世界经济展望